Global media networks have circulated pictures and articles related to last week’s gathering, the arrest of 300 people that followed and indications of abuses by the security forces in response to the incident. 

Obviously, the government should be more concerned about its international notoriety in Papua instead of obsessing over the Cabinet reshuffle, domestic popularity and securing their finances for the 2014 elections. 

Undoubtedly, the timing of the congress was arranged to coincide with Jakarta’s preoccupation with its internal political rivalries and weak leadership. 

Indonesia urgently needs to shift its approach from seeing Papua as the problem and focus more on solving the issues perceived by the region as its main grievances. 

Located in the easternmost part of Indonesia, Papua has always been geographically, ethnically and culturally distinct from the rest, standing as the ultimate testament to Indonesia’s claim of unity in diversity. Unfortunately, unresolved grievances have made the region grow politically distant from Jakarta. 

Most peace initiatives have failed to address the main issues of (1) history and political identity, (2) continued marginalization of indigenous Papuans, (3) failure of development, (4) the increasingly limited room for Papuan social and cultural expression and (5) the sustained heavy presence of security forces and continued abuses in Papua. 

Policy makers in Jakarta should initially focus on one of the five problematic areas above instead of lumping them together simply as “the Papuan problem”. 

First, concessions on the issues of history and political identity will be extremely unfavorable for Jakarta at this point. The reach of national educational infrastructure, the key instrument in constructing the nation through history and national identity, is still very limited and of poor quality, especially in Papua. 

From 1945 to the mid-1960s, Papua was excluded from Indonesia’s “formative years of nation-building” while the Netherlands, until 1969, retained effective administrative control over Papua and contributed greatly to fostering a sense of Papuan history and political identity that is entirely separate from Indonesia. 

Reconciling history and political identity should not be done without first improving the educational and informational infrastructure that can accommodate a balanced and dignified representation of both identities. 

The families and children of Papuan combatants, driven deep into the forests and swamps of Papua’s interior, should also be granted access to Indonesia’s educational system because they will be the future makers — or breakers — of peace. 

The dangers of reconciling the issues of history and political identity should also be learned from Bosnia’s painful experience in which the education system failed to reconcile different identities and was instead utilized as an instrument of segregation, conflict and enmity-building between different groups.

Second, affirmative policy has been continuously interpreted merely as the redistribution of rights and resources – not responsibilities. Since the Special Autonomy in 2001, affirmative policy has become justified politically as “buying off Papuans” by giving them public positions as well as “autonomy” funds.

Experts concur that this approach has resulted in public positions being filled by individuals with inadequate skills, knowledge or capacity to perform their functions, further contributing to the image of an ineffective and dysfunctional Indonesian state in Papua. 

Local Papuan political elites are well known for boasting about the amount of financial resources available from Jakarta that they can misuse, squander, and waste — indicating a poor sense of responsibility and accountability in using the financial concessions made by Jakarta. Such misuse of rights and resources continues to be swept under the carpet by Jakarta, wrongly perceiving this as “accommodative”, “non-interventional” and respecting Papuan autonomy. 

Indonesia, as a democracy, necessitates a solid system of checks-and-balances, accountability, and transparency in which Papua should not — and should never be — an exception.

Affirmative policy should focus on equal opportunity and increased access to the public benefits provided by the state, such as security, education and health. It should empower Papuans to participate meaningfully in “the process” and should refrain from simply doling out “the goods” to Papuans without at the same time strengthening their sense of responsibility and accountability. Multiculturalism policies in Canada and New Zealand toward its indigenous population might serve as notable lessons for Indonesia.

Third, an economic-developmental approach to Papua should not overshadow the political goal of “ownership” of the development process itself. Local Papuan elites who are unable to implement sound economic policies should not be 
allowed to hold strategic public offices, squandering development funding and then blaming Jakarta once it fails. 

A discussion with Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, an expert on Indonesian internal politics, noted that it has become increasingly common to see local Papuan elites become fervent supporters of “M” (merdeka, or freedom) as soon as their term in office — along with the economic resources attached to it — can no longer be extended.

Fourth, limited room for Papuan social and cultural expression and recognition of their cultural distinction will continue to be a sensitive issue. 

Edy Prasetyono, an expert on Indonesian security, noted that some have suggested drawing Papua’s administrative borders according to its social and cultural boundaries to achieve better security and stability in the region. 

However, such an incorporation of Papua’s distinct customs and culture into its local political system can potentially backfire and be used as an instrument to argue that since Papuan politics are distinct, it should therefore be separate from the Indonesian political system. 

For this reason, cultural expression continues to be negatively perceived by Jakarta as a potential instrument of political consolidation and mobilization of secessionist aspirations. 

Lastly, efforts toward dialogue have failed due to the heavy militaristic approach in Papua — often but not always emanating from Jakarta — with numerous military and intelligence operations that cannot be justified to the Indonesian public. Recent unnecessary civilian casualties showed the gap between the peace rhetoric and the unchanged heavy-handed response in Papua. 

In the end, Indonesia will need to carefully and gradually address the region’s five main problematic issues one by one. The five issues are interlinked, but Jakarta can — and should — identify areas that will contribute meaningfully toward peace as well as areas that will only further distance and segregate 
Papua from the rest of Indonesia. 

Political concessions should only be made on the basis of such identification and also within Indonesia’s democratic corridors of accountability.

The writer is a program director of Pacivis at the University of Indonesia, Depok, West Java.